Once Upon a Time in Not-so-communist China

Psychological Shock

Constitutional Shennanigans

German East Africa Campaign: A study of a guerrilla-style ass-kicking given to the British

*Note: Nyasaland = Malawi, German East Africa = Tanzania - the island of Zanzibar, Northern Rhodesia = Zambia, Southern Rhodesia = Zimbabwe.

           Of all of the German colonies in WWI, German East Africa was the one that faired the best.  Despite the complete occupation of the colony by Allied forces by the end of 1917, the German forces under Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck survived until the after the end of the war only being informed of having only been informed of it on the morning of November 12^th, 1918.[1]  At the start of 1914 he had only 216 European officers and 2450 askaris (soldiers native to the region) to defend 400,000 square miles of territory.  In 1915 when his forces reached maximum strength these numbers swelled to 3000 Europeans and 11,000 askaris.  Throughout the war, his troops managed to tie up a total of 130,000[2] Allied soldiers.[3] 

How could this masterful military feat be accomplished?  It can mainly be attributed to four factors.   First was the tactical advantage of Lettow-Vorbeck’s unique objective which was to keep the army alive in order to tie up as many troops as possible.  Second, the environment of German-East Africa and the very effective methods in which he managed to adapt to its hazards produced another significant advantage for the German forces.  Third, not only did technology at the time prefer the defender but so did the environment of German East Africa.  Fourth, the allied forces were poorly organized, incompetent and ill suited for the African environment

Lettow-Vorbeck knew he could not defend German East Africa because it was surrounded on all sides by allied colonies, except to the west where the Indian Ocean was mostly controlled by the British Royal Navy.  As a result of this, instead of fighting to win he decided to keep the Allied forces as busy as possible to prevent them from fighting against the central powers on other fronts.  The goal became, instead of holding territory, to ensure that his army never suffered a decisive defeat.[4]  This strategy was reflected in his tactics throughout the war.  His first true test was at the battle of Tanga. 

On November 2^nd-5^th the British tried to land a force at the northern port of Tanga.  Here, specific examples of the reasons behind the German success can be seen.  First, the battle had been poorly organized on behalf of the British.  Major-General A.E. Aitken led a force of 8000 (IEF ‘B’ Indian Expeditionary Force ‘B’) soldiers and 3000 (IEF ‘C’) Indian and African troops.[5]  These troops had been at sea for several weeks to a month confined in hot, stuffy boats with little chance to train or exercise they had also never trained together before or were ever even trained in amphibious operations.  When the troops came ashore they did so at low tied resulting in many of their boats getting caught on the surrounding reefs.[6]  When the town was finally taken by the British the German forces withdrew because of mistaken call on a bugle.  The British had failed to notice this and were instead focusing on was their belief that their forces were too heavily damaged to continue fighting.  This resulted in their sudden and disorganized withdrawal and the British leaving behind most of their equipment.[7]

Despite victory and allied incompetence the Germans were very close to losing the battle of Tanga.  In Ross Anderson’s article, he criticizes Lettow-Vorbeck for having too few troops in the vicinity despite having known about the British landing in advance, describing the reason for this as “unclear.”  This behavior, though, perfectly fits the tactics used by Lettow-Vorbeck throughout the war.  The key to his strategy, as previously mentioned, was not to hold land but to keep the enemy troops busy and by not committing a significant number of troops to the battle of Tanga he ensured that even if he lost he’d still have a sizeable force to keep the British busy.  The trouble the British experienced when coming ashore also reflected not only the incompetence of the Allied forces and their incapability to adapt to the African environment but also the way in which the technology at the time favored the defender as the German forces had machine guns trained on the British units. [8]

This unexpected victory for Lettow-Vorbeck won him 16 machine guns, 455 rifles, 600 000 rounds of ammunition, a year free of any large-scale allied attacks and an opportunity to have an askari force constantly move into Kenya and put mines on the railway connecting Mombasa with Nairobi.  Aside from the defeat of this initial invasion force, the other reason for the lack of any sizeable army attacking German East Africa was because the Ottoman Empire had joined the war on the side of the Central Powers. [9]  During this period he scuttled his last naval vessel, the Konigsburg and salvaged the weapons off of it, adapting them for land warfare by rigging them up as artillery loaded onto carriages.[10]

His power over German East Africa waned significantly starting in 1916 when the British hired a general famous for his experience with guerrilla warfare from the Boer War, Jan Smuts.[11]  His forces moved in from Kenya and finally put Lettow-Vorbeck on the defensive and within a month had forced him out of his best farming area and had cut him off from attacking the Uganda railway.  Smuts had not achieved a real victory, however.  This is how Lettow-Vorbeck’s strategy worked.  He would simply withdraw, engaging the enemy at key points.  The only way for Smuts to stop the German southward retreat would be to outflank and surround them on all sides but instead Smuts had two armies marching southwards, completely unable to catch up with Lettow-Vorbeck’s force.  Not only was their advance repetitively harassed and halted by German attacks but their advance was also slowed because of constant rain turning the roads into ditches of mud.  Sleeping sickness from the tsetse fly also killed off any pack animal (horses, donkeys, mules).[12]  In David Rooney’s description of Lettow-Vorbeck’s exploits he even notes that the British had attempted to use cavalry in German East Africa which quickly fell victim to the Tsetse fly.  The German’s, however, used their home-field advantage to keep their cattle in areas with little or no tsetse flies.[13]

Once again we have an example of the Germans defending their position and drawing the Allied forces into unfavorable combat situations, compounded with the Allies failing to adapt to the environment and the Germans succeeding at doing so.

The final stage of the campaign is where Lettow-Vorbeck’s tactics can truly be seen as masterful.  At the end of 1917 he realized that he only had a month’s supply of quinine, a drug used to prevent malaria, and he was also running low on weapons, ammunition and food supplies.  In response to this crisis he left many of his forces behind to be captured by the British.  This left him with only 300 Europeans and 1700 askaris and 3000 carriers.[14]  Sacrificing size for mobility, this made it possible for him to cross the border into Portuguese East Africa, loot supplies from the countryside and from the poorly disciplined Portuguese regiments.  Food was also acquired mostly from the land. Most of the troops were fed by a combination of looted supplies and hunting the local wildlife.[15]  This behavior demonstrates that Lettow-Vorbeck’s forces even managed to adapt to the local environment despite having lost their advantage of being on familiar territory.  It was in this fashion that he survived until the end of the war, finally surrendering in Zambia to honor the armistice signed by the European countries.

Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and his remaining men had survived just less than 5 years of bitter war.  The German forces tied up the surrounding colonies so significantly that the resources required to catch them cost more than the surrounding colonies could logistically afford, especially in manpower.  In Nyasaland alone over 200,000 men were drafted for the war effort for the native regiments such as the King’s African Rifles[16] or as porters carrying supplies.[17]  The severity of the effort required to gather this force sparked two small uprisings within the protectorate.[18]  The total cost of the British war effort was 72,000,000 pounds.[19]

Given these results, it would be a rational conclusion to say that the Lettow-Vorbeck was successful in his goal of occupying the allied forces to keep them away from other fronts.  His army was the only German army within Africa to last until the end of the war.  His clever use of guerrilla tactics, his ability to adapt to the environment and his constant state of either brief small attacks or long drawn-out defensive battles was instrumental to his survival and is one of the forgotten epics of the first world war.

Unified Theory

Physicists have long been researching a unifed theory of everything.  A principle which governs all motion would definately be appealing indeed.  If this principle were to be discovered than it could be used to explain all natural phenomenon.  Unfortunately, it doesn't work that way.  We have to work backwards, like all theoretical advancement we have to look at phenomenon and try to find a concept that explains it.  With physics, of course, this is very hard.  A unified theory in the field of physics could be used to explain pretty much everything else as every field of science is merely a higher manifestation of physics.  Chemistry, geology, meteorology are all about one or one and a half steps above physics.  Then from chemistry comes biochemistry and biology.  From biochemistry comes neurochemistry which leads to psychology.  From individual psychology and geology/meteorology (surrounding environments) we get collective psychology such as sociology which leads us to anthropology, history and politics.  A unified theory of everything could stand to impact physics which is the most basic root of every other subject of study.

That said, the successful study of any subject is always to try and find a unified theory governing that field.  It will definately not be possible for it to be as complete as the unified theory of everything.  In a reading assignment I have found a man who, in 1968, wrote an excellent unified theory for collective human behavior.  He postulated that all social advancement came from the advance of technology.  That new technology produced a new identity among the younger generation which would clash with the identity of the older generation and result in a war.  For example, The old order of nobility and chivelry in Europe was upheld by the fact that only the rich nobles could afford sword training and armor.  This would almost guaruntee that in any battle only a nobleman could win a fight against another.  Once gunpowder was invented their armor became useless and special training wasn't as effective as an advantage anymore.  This new technology empowered the lower classes, especially in the military, and brought a new social order to Europe.

The theory is that every war can be traced back to a social advancement cause the the invention of a technology.  If this theory rings true, then a war of some kind with China and India may be inevitable.  China's manufacturing economy, low wages and operating costs, industrialization and the advancement of shipping and telecommunications technology has resulted it in threatening the traditional identity of the west as being the masters of the industrial realm.  Furthermore, the advancement of telecommunications in combination with low wages and operating costs as well as as the commonality of English as a second language in India has also been challanging the west's supremacy in the service industry.  With our identity being threatened, a clash between these two western powers may be inevitable.

War with China and India.  I certainly hope we don't have to take em both at once.  We just might lose.  Their capacity for nukes as well as their unstoppable zergling rush would serve as a great advantage.  Fortunately, their isolation from western powers may make it possible to contain them through a large navy as the zergling rush is a poor tactic to use at sea or across distances long distances of hostile terrain.